Apr 2, 2026
RSAC 2026: securing non-human identities and AI agents at scale
At RSAC 2026, P0 Security breaks down why non-human identities, service accounts and AI agents need a different access model than human users, and what organizations need to do now to control risk, improve visibility and enforce least privilege.
Non-human identities need to be managed differently from human identities because they do not behave the same way. Traditional privileged access management systems were largely built around human workflows, where a person logs in, performs a task and logs out. Service accounts, workloads and AI agents operate differently, and those differences matter.
As organizations deploy more non-human identities, especially agentic systems, the access problem grows quickly. These identities often interact with sensitive systems at scale, and they are increasingly attractive targets for attackers. In many environments, non-human identities already outnumber human users, and they often have broad or standing access to critical resources.
One common mistake is treating all non-human identities the same. Service identities and agentic identities are not identical. A service account usually follows a predefined pattern created by a developer or administrator. An agentic identity is different. It is given a set of capabilities and then decides which actions to take based on a goal or task. That creates a different risk model.
Another common mistake is overpermissioning. Organizations often give agents broad access because they want them to be effective right away. But that creates serious risk, especially when there is no clear ownership model behind the identity. If an agent has broad access and no clean tie back to a human owner or accountable team, the organization loses control, accountability and auditability.
The opportunity is to build in guardrails from the start. Non-human identities and agents should have clear ownership, clear accountability and access that is limited to what they actually need. That means just-enough privilege and, where possible, just-in-time access. The goal is not to deploy agents broadly and then rely on detection tools to tell you later when something goes wrong. The goal is to start with preventive controls.
A practical approach begins with visibility. Organizations first need inventory. They need to know what non-human identities exist, what they do and who owns them. Ownership matters because when access needs to change, a human owner has to be able to make that decision.
From there, organizations need to understand entitlements and lifecycle management. That includes how credentials are issued, rotated and revoked, as well as how permissions are granted, changed and removed over time. Credential lifecycle and entitlement lifecycle are separate but related problems, and both need to be managed.
This is becoming urgent because nearly every enterprise is now building some type of copilot or agent, whether for customer support, security operations, HR, finance or internal workflows. These systems need runtime authorization controls so access decisions can be evaluated in context and enforced in real time.
For example, a SOC agent helping triage alerts should only have the permissions needed to interact with the relevant security tools. An HR agent should not be able to retrieve payroll or employee data outside the scope of a specific request. The same principle applies broadly: agents should not have blanket access just because they are useful.
The broader direction is to secure authorization across all identity types, including humans, non-human identities and agents. In fast-moving environments, detection after the fact is often too late. Least privilege, clear ownership and runtime authorization are becoming the more important control model.
The goal is to move organizations toward a zero standing privilege or least privilege posture across their enterprise infrastructure, with consistent controls that apply no matter what kind of identity is taking action.